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The Case of the Amorous Defendant: Criticizing 
Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. * 
APRIL 2001 
Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry 
Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first 
important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the govern-
ment's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic 
Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. 1 Defendant Amo-
rous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of 
his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the ad-
mitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. At-
torney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which 
criminalizes the knowing transportation of "any individual in inter-
state or foreign commerce ... with intent that such individual engage 
in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be 
charged with a criminal offense."2 
The trial judge instructed the jury to convict Amorous if he paid 
for his lover's transportation with the purpose of bringing her across 
state lines so that they could engage in extramarital sexual relations, 
which is a criminal offense in Virginia.3 The judge based the instruc-
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1973, Davidson College; M.A. 1974, 
Harvard; J.D. 1978, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to Dan Farber and Larry Marshall for very 
helpful comments, and to Lon Fuller, whose The Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 616 (1949), inspired the format of this correspondence. 
1. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424). 
2. Section 2421 ohitle 18 reads: 
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in 
any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in 
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2421. This reflects the amendment by Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b)(l), 100 Stat. 3511 
(1986). Before 1986, § 2421 read, in relevant part: 
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Co-
lumbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, any woman or girl for the 
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent 
and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to 
give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice. , • [s]hall be fined 
not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
18 u.s.c. § 2421 (1982). 
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344: "Any person, not being married, who voluntarily shall have 
sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty of fornication, punishable as a Class 4 
2450 
August 1990] Correspondence 2451 
tion on her reading of the Supreme Court's 1917 interpretation of the 
statute in Caminetti v. United States, 4 which held that the original ver-
sion of the Mann Act criminalized a broad range of extramarital sex-
ual relations as "immoral practice," and the Court's 1993 decision in 
Squalid v. United States, 5 which held that the amended version of the 
Mann Act incorporates the Caminetti holding and should be read 
broadly to penalize any sexual activity considered "immoral" by "'a 
relevant regulatory community."6 
The jury convicted the law student, and the judge sentenced him to 
eighteen months in prison. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but voiced 
doubts about the continued validity of the Caminetti and Squalid 
precedents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the legal-
ity of the conviction. Through gossipy law clerks, I have gathered 
documents shedding light on the Marshall Court's treatment of this 
issue. The following is my reconstruction of the Court's interesting 
deliberations. · 
At conference, all nine Justices agreed that the conviction ought to 
be overturned. Chief Justice Marshall assigned the opinion to himself. 
In his draft opinion for Amorous v. United States, he started with the 
proposition that the Caminetti and Squalid precedents interpreting the 
statute ought to be reaffirmed, based upon the arguments in his earlier 
law review article for a rule of absolute stare decisis in statutory cases. 7 
The Chief Justice's draft opinion candidly noted that the Court has 
occasionally overruled its precedents interpreting federal statutes in 
the past, and that Caminetti would, under the Court's traditional ap-
proach, be a possible candidate for overrulll;ig. 8 Caminetti's view that 
the statute criminalized transportation of a woman for extramarital 
relations was probably an excessively broad interpretation of the stat-
misdemeanor." See also VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-345 (criminalizing "lewd and lascivious cohabi-
tation"); VA. CooE ANN. § 18.2-361 (criminalizing "crimes against nature," including oral and 
anal sexual intercourse between consenting adults); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (criminalizing 
"adultery"). 
4. 242 U.S. 470 (1917); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (reaffirming 
Caminetti interpretation of 1910 Act). 
5. 510 U.S. 435 (1993). 
6. The Squalid Court was closely divided. A four Justice plurality took the position that 
Caminetti was reaffirmed by the 1986 amendments to the Mann Act. Four dissenting Justices 
argued that Caminetti should be overruled, either because it was a bad statutory decision to start 
with, or because Congress' amendment had negated it, or for both reasons. The critical fifth 
Justice concurred in the plurality's result but reasoned thus: Caminetti was wrongly decided in 
1917; stare decisis, however, counseled against overruling that precedent; the 1986 amendments 
did not grapple with the Caminetti issue and so cannot be said to have negated the precedent. 
7. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It'~· The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989). 
8. See generally Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988). 
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ute in 1917, because it went well beyond the original legislative expec-
tations,9 and is certainly too broad today, in light of current 
constitutional protections of sexual privacy.10 
The Chief Justice's draft opinion argued, however, that henceforth 
the Court should never overrule its statutory precedents. His argu-
ment was taken almost verbatim from his earlier article and ran as 
follows: Federal judges make a great deal of law in our representative 
democracy, and most of that judicial lawmaking is unavoidable, even 
in statutory interpretation. 11 The lawmaking is nonetheless in tension 
with the overall majoritarian framework of our government, and 
should be reduced if possible. 12 The usual (tired) strategy for reducing 
judicial lawmaking is to restrain judicial creativity, but a more produc-
tive strategy is to stimulate greater legislative activity, which reduces 
the need for courts to create new law by updating statutes with crea-
tive interpretations.13 Because an absolute rule of stare decisis for stat-
utory precedents would stimulate at least some additional legislative 
activity to update statutes, the Court should adopt such a rule. 14 The 
Chief Justice's opinion therefore reaffirmed the Caminetti/Squalid in-
terpretation of the Mann Act as criminalizing extramarital relations. 
The opinion overturned Amorous' conviction, though, because the 
statute as applied in a case of fornication is an unconstitutional inva-
sion of Amorous' right to privacy. 
The Chief Justice circulated his draft opinion to the Court, but no 
other Justice was willing to join the opinion, even though all nine Jus-
tices are themselves former professors and, therefore, open to rethink-
ing stare decisis. Three Justices wrote draft concurring opinions, 
which I reproduce here. I have edited the opinions (deleting most case 
citations) and added bracketed footnotes of my own to tie their argu-
ments to Chief Justice Marshall's earlier work. 
* * * 
9. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 497-99 (McKenna, J., dissenting) Qegislative history makes clear 
that Mann Act was only aimed at prostitution and similar mercenary activities related to "white 
slavery"). 
10. See United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). 
11. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 202-04. 
12. Id. at 204-07. 
13. Id. at 207-08. 
14. There should be a marginally higher level of congressional oversight in a system in 
which courts apply a heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare decisis. For in that 
system the legislators, lobbyists, and public all know that any changes in the interpretation 
of statutes can come only through legislative action - not through ajudicial reversal of the 
announced interpretation. 
Id. at 211; see id. at 211-19 (supporting argumentation). 
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"Opinion of Posnerbrook, J., joined by McNollgast & Schwartz, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment. The Chief Justice's opinion identifies a 
persistent problem, excessive judicial lawmaking in our representative 
democracy. It also offers a productive problem-solving approach, 
namely, bright-line rules that will provide countervailing incentives to 
the relevant actors (here, incentives to encourage legislators to respond 
to Supreme Court decisions). The Chief Justice's suggested rule, how-
ever, will not necessarily solve the problem and, instead, may exacer-
bate countermajoritarian· features of our system. 
"The evidence is insufficient to reject the Court's longstanding 
willingness to overrule its statutory precedents in compelling circum-
stances. The Chief Justice has a heavy burden of demonstrating that 
his rule would stimulate the legislature to greater involvement in its 
constitutional responsibility for updating statutes. He has not met 
that burden. Several state courts have rules of absolute stare decisis 
for statutory precedents, yet the Chief Justice has advanced no evi-
dence suggesting that their legislatures are more active in updating 
statutes than are the national legislature or the legislatures of states 
having more flexible stare decisis rules. 15 The Chief Justice seeks to 
avoid the dearth of empirical evidence by relying instead on academic 
theories. But they provide little more than speculative support for his 
proposal. · 
" 'Public choice theory,' the application of economic principles to 
political markets, does not indicate significantly, if any, greater legisla-
tive involvement under a rule of absolute stare decisis. 16 Public choice 
theory, like many other theories of the legislative process, assumes 
that reelection is the most important motivation for legislators. Legis-
lators desiring reelection are interested in appeasing important interest 
groups, but without offending other organized groups (to the extent 
this is possible). Legislators, consequently, have an incentive to re-
15. The Chief Justice reminds us that English courts very rarely overrule statutory prece-
dents and that Parliament has often responded to judicial invitations to reverse court decisions. 
See Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare 
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2467, 2471 & n.18 (1990). The ChiefJustice is wise not to rely on this 
as evidence supporting his proposal, not only because the English system is different (the Chief 
Justice's stated reason}, but also because the two points are unrelated. Most judicial decisions 
containing invitations for Congress or Parliament to overrule have nothing to do with stare deci-
sis. They are typically decisions where a harsh result flows from the statutory language, which 
courts will implement in most instances. E.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), overruled by 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752 (1978), and Pub. L. No. 96-69, tit. IV, 93 Stat. 437, 
449 (1979). 
16. [Marshall, supra note 7, at 211, relies on public choice theory to argue: Legislators' 
desire to avoid taking controversial positions impels them to shift responsibility as much as possi-
ble to courts (and agencies). When the Court hands down a questionable statutory decision for 
which there is a possibility of judicial overruling, legislators can tell interest groups hurt by the 
decision that their best recourse is to the Court.] 
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spond to many of the Court's statutory decisions, whatever this 
Court's stare decisis rule, when the decisions harm the interests of im-
portant groups. These groups will petition the legislators to overrule 
such decisions, and they will usually be successful if thete is little or no 
organized opposition. Legislators may have fewer incentives to re-
spond to decisions of this Court which benefit some organized groups 
while hurting other organized groups, because legislators want to 
avoid offending ·any politically salient group. But legislators in these 
'conflictual' situations have incentives to work out a compromise 
which will alter the Court's decisions in a way acceptable to most or 
all the relevant groups. Legislators. already have plenty of incentives 
to respond to the Court's decisions. Nothing in the Chief Justice's 
opinion changes these incentives in the legislative process. 
"The Chief Justice argues that legislators will refer losing interest 
groups to the court system so long as the Court will sometimes recon-
sider statutory precedents and that absolute stare decisis will render 
tliiS strategy less feasible. A difficulty with this argument is that legis-
lators cannot credibly pass the buck under current Supreme Court 
practice: It takes decades for the Court to overrule virtually any statu-
tory or common law precedent, whatever the stare decisis rule. 17 In-
terest groups do not want to wait decades. They want action now, or 
soon. The Chief Justice's rule seems unlikely to make any difference 
in the short term, namely, the period ten years or so after the statutory 
precedent. This argument finds support in Congress' willingness to 
address the Court's precedents under the current regime, in which the 
Court is quite willing to overrule or reinterpret statutory precedents. I 
17. The Court acted only once in the period 1961 to 1987 to overrule a statutory precedent 
within five years of its decision. It has never done so after 1965. The Court explicitly overruled 
statutory precedents in 17 cases between 1971 and 1989. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ 
American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas 
Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1427-28 (cases 1971-87). Only two of the 
cases overruled precedents less than 20 years old. 
The Chief Justice does not sufficiently appreciate this point. He seems to think that it takes 
many years to overrule a statutory precedent primarily because the Court now adheres to a 
super-strong presumption of correctness for its statutory precedents. [See Marshall, supra note 
15, at 2471.] This is not the case. Overruling a statutory precedent in the short term is unlikely 
because it takes a long time for problems with the precedent to ripen (usually through lower 
court decisions) and because the Court is too busy to reexamine its precedents constantly. This is 
the point of normal stare decisis and has little if anything to do with heightened stare decisis. 
Following normal stare decisis, this Court has not in the last century overruled any of its com-
mon law precedents within 20 years of their decision. E.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer 
Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1975) (overruling The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 
How.) 170 (1855)); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266-68 (1972) 
(overruling The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866)); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 
398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970) (overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886)); see also Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980) (overruling Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 
(1958), based on same arguments raised in 1958 dissenting opinion). 
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reproduce in the margin Supreme Court decisions overruled by Con-
gress between 1982 and 1986 (a period chosen at random). 18 Congress 
overruled at least twenty-four Supreme Court statutory precedents, 
not an inconsiderable number. Congress overruled twenty of the 
twenty-four precedents within ten years of the Court's decisions, six-
teen of the twenty-four within five years of the Court's decisions, and 
twelve of the twenty-four within two years of the Court's decisions. 
This evidence lends some support to the hypothesis that Congress al-
ready has substantial incentives to respond to this Court's. statutory 
precedents in the short term. 
"The only argument legitimately left to the Chief Justice-is that 
18. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(b},).Oo 
Stat. 3359, 3439-40 (1986) (see 1986 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5728); Block v. 
North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983), overruled or modified by Pub. L. No. 99-598, 100 Stat. 3351 
(1986) (see 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5643, 5643-44); United States v. New York 
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-68 (1977), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868-72 
(1986) (see 1986 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3555, 3556, 3599-3603); Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 
1845 (1986) (see S. REP. No. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986)); United States Dept. of 
Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477U.S. 597 (1986), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 
Stat. 1080 (1986) (see 1986 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2328-30); Smith v. Robin-
son, 468 U.S. 992 (1984}, overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (see 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1798, 1799-811); Lanibert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore& O.R.R., 
258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3, 100 Stat. 633, 637 (1986) (see 
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1545, 1553); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125 
(1980), overruled by Pub. L. No. 99-200, 99 Stat. 1663 (1985); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5827, 5828); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 
(1978), overruled or modified by Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750-51 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4602, 4603-08); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), and Simp-
son v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1004, 98 Stat. 
1837, 2138-39 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3490-92); Washington 
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 (1984), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-426, 
§ 4, 98 Stat. 1639, 1641 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2734, 2774); Die-
drich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982), overruled in part by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1026, 98 
Stat. 494, 1031 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1328-29); United 
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421, 98 Stat. 494, 793-95 
(1984) (see 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1134-35, 1804); Commissioner v. 
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-369, 
§ 21 l(a), 98 Stat. 494, 740-41 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1072-73, 
1748-53); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), overruled by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333, 390-91 (1984) (see 130 CONG. REC. 14851-52, 17151-59 (1984)); Federal Maritime 
Commn. v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968), overruled or modified by 
Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 7, 98 Stat. 67, 73-74 (1984) (see 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
167, 174, 222-23); Rowan Cos. v. United States; 452 U.S. 247 (1981), reasoning overruled by Pub. 
L. No. 98-21, § 327, 97 Stat. 65, 126-27 (1983) (see 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
143, 183); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Agsalud, 454 U.s: 801 (1981), overruled by P.ub. L. No. 
97-473, § 301, 96 Stat. 2605, 2611-12 (1982) (see 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4580, 
4595, 4603); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government oflndia, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), overruled by Pub. L. No. 
97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (see 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3495, 3495); McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), overruled by Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002, 96 Stat. 718, 730-35 
(1982) (see 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1555, 1570); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980), overruled by Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (see 1982 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 177-79, 194). 
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absolute stare decisis will signal groups hurt by a statutory precedent 
but unable to obtain legislative relief in the short term, to stick with 
Congress (and not tum to this Court) as the forum for overruling in 
the long term as well. 19 It is hard to say that such a rule would actu-
ally have much effect, due to the difficulty in focusing Congress' atten-
tion on old and stale policy issues. But it is equally hard to say that 
the Chief Justice's proposed rule would not have some benefit along 
these lines. The issue then is whether there are costs of the proposed 
rule which would outweigh this quite modest potential benefit. The 
obvious cost of the proposal is that no one will overrule a number of 
stupid decisions which never generate sufficient legislative attention 
over the long haul. This is a substantial cost of the Chief Justice's 
proposal, not only because it perpetuates inefficient legal rules, but 
also because its consequences will often be countermajoritarian. 
"Consider the occasions in which this Court has overruled old 
statutory precedents (i.e., those decided more than twenty years 
ago). 20 The Court has typically contributed to, rather than derogated 
from, majoritarian policy when it has overruled such statutory prece-
dents. One reason the Court has given for overruling old precedents is 
subsequent statutory developments.21 A statutory precedent can be 
quite plausible when originally decided, but implausible over time if its 
effects are inconsistent with the terms or policies of statutes subse-
quently enacted by the legislature. This Court's traditional role in 
statutory interpretation is to reconcile prior law, including common 
law and statutory precedents, with new statutes over time. The Chief 
Justice's rule of absolute stare decisis might prevent this Court from 
overruling precedents that are practically inconsistent with new stat-
utes. That would often be countermajoritarian, because it would dis-
courage the Court from updating precedents in light of modem 
19. This is a plausible argument for the Chief Justice, because congressional overruling of 
Supreme Court statutory precedents usually occurs within ten years (if it occurs at all), and 
judicial overruling of the same type of precedents usually occurs after ten years have passed (if it 
occurs at all). 
20. This analysis draws on Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1364-84, 1399-400, 1427-29. The Chief 
Justice correctly states that the Court rarely finds that an old statutory precedent clearly miscon-
strued the original legislative expectations. This was a substantial reason in only 3 of the 26 cases 
between 1961 and 1987 explicitly overruling statutory precedents. Id. at 1427-29. 
21. This was a reason given by the Court in 10 of the 28 overrulings between 1961 and 1989. 
See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 & n.12 (1988); Brown 
v. Hotel Employees Intl. Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05, 509-10 (1984); Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105·07 
(1977); Lodge 76, Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commn., 427 
U.S. 132, 154 (1976); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 499-500 (1973); 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University oflll. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); Carafas 
v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 240 (1968); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1966); James v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1961). 
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legislative policy.22 
"Another reason the Court has given for overruling old precedents 
has been their impracticability. 23 Statutory precedents often do not 
work as anticipated. The original statutory terrain changes, as the leg-
islature enacts new statutes and the courts interpret them. Society it-
self changes, often in response to the statute. The original 
assumptions undergirding the precedent prove to be wrong, and this 
renders the precedent unworkable or even counterproductive. It 
hardly subserves majoritarian lawmaking for the Court to reaffirm a 
precedent that makes a mess of the legislature's statutory scheme. 
"A final reason the Court has given for overruling old precedents 
has been their tension with evolving constitutional norms. 24 The 
Court often avoids difficult constitutional issues by reinterpreting stat-
utes. The Chief Justice's absolute rule would, sometimes require the 
Court to confront these issues before it is ready to do so. Prematurely 
confronting these issues might tempt the Court toward constitutional 
activism, which is of course countermajoritarian. Consider this case. 
The Court should overrule Caminetti because that precedent misinter-
preted the legislature's original expectations,25 and the Court should 
overrule Squalid because that precedent unnecessarily perpetuated the 
earlier error in Caminetti. The Chief Justice refuses to overrule these 
precedents but instead invalidates the statute as applied. He does that 
by expanding the constitutional right to privacy to include extramari-
tal sexual conduct. That is a bold constitutional step, one that we can 
22. The Chief Justice might well create an exception for these cases, based upon the argu-
ment that the subsequent statute "effectively" overrules the precedent. This would be a broad 
exception that would significantly dilute the Chief Justice's rule, though. It is also inconsistent 
with the Chief Justice's rule, because the subsequent statute does not squarely overrule the prece-
dent in the cases to which I refer. 
23. The Court gave practical reasons as a justification in 13 of the 28 cases overruling statu-
tory precedents between 1961 and 1989. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
485 U.S. 271, 284-86 (1988); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 
U.S. 235, 249-55 (1970); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 
U.S. 54, 67 (1968); Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 240 (1968); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 
519, 526-27 (1966); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965); Harris v. United States, 
382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 291, 435-36 (1963); James v. United States, 366 
U.S. 213, 222 (1961). 
24. The Court relied on subsequent constitutional developments to overrule statutory prece-
dents in 6 of 28 cases between 1961 and 1989. See Welch v. Texas Highways & Pub. Transp. 
Dept., 483 U.S. 468, 476-78 (1987); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 230 (1987); Guardi-
ans Assn. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 92-96, 101-02 (1971); Brenner v. Man-
son, 383 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1966). 
25. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 497-99 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (sponsor and committee 
statements reveal that Mann Act sought to criminalize prostitution rings, not sexual relations 
generally). 
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avoid by overruling the precedent. Confessing this Court's own error 
is the proper democracy-enhancing stance in this case. Using this case 
as an occasion to create new constitutional law is countermajoritarian. 
The Chief Justice's proposed rule of absolute stare decisis threatens to 
be countermajoritarian over time, because it encourages this Court to 
engage in unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking. 
"A final consequence of the Chief Justice's proposed rule is the 
most troubling. The Constitution sets forth a clearly defined system of 
separate powers. The Chief Justice is correct in saying that the legisla-
ture should make all major policy choices in our polity. The Chief 
Justice is also correct in saying that the courts should do nothing more 
than interstitial lawmaking. The Chief Justice is not demonstrably 
correct in saying that throwing the Court's own mistakes back to the 
legislature subserves the democratic process. The legislature's agenda 
is not infinitely elastic. Thousands of issues compete for its attention, 
and only a few important policy initiatives can run the procedural jug-
gernaut each year. Our tossing complex issues of legal coherence back 
to the legislature further crowds its agenda. The legislature might in-
deed respond by overruling the precedents itself. But the opportunity 
costs will often be high. The legislature has better things to do than 
clean up our own augean stables." 
* * * 
"Opinion of Fisserman, J., joined by Michaelminow & Guidobresi, 
JJ., concurring in the judgment. We are deeply disturbed by the Chief 
Justice's inaugural opinion. We find the opinion filled with talk of 
reining in judicial discretion and of stimulating the legislature to 
greater activity. What we do not find in the Chief Justice's opinion is 
any concern about justice. Justice in the individual case. Equal justice 
for all our citizens. The Chief Justice's opinion loses sight of the 
human dimensions of this case. This case is not about stare decisis. 
This case is about a law student - albeit an unhappily named one -
who was nabbed by authorities for doing what most law students do 
these mobile days, often bringing their lovers across state lines. This 
case is about a statute which has profound constitutional problems 
and which - surely as a result of those problems - is almost never 
enforced anymore. This case is an outrage. Its outrageousness sheds 
great light on Caminetti and Squalid, precedents we now ought to 
overrule. 
"While the Chief Justice ultimately agrees with us about the result, 
for perfectly good constitutional reasons, the implications of his abso-
lute rule of stare decisis in statutory cases trouble us greatly. Its rigid-
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ity will yield injustice in many cases, which we believe undermines the 
'judicial Power.' Under Article III, the judge in our national system 
of courts handles 'Cases or Controversies.' This reminds us of the 
traditional role of the judge, which is to hand down justice to the par-
ties in the Case or Controversy. This is very different from the role of 
a legislator, who makes rules prospectively and usually without atten-
tion to a concrete case. By asking judges to render unjust results in 
cases where governing precedent is demonstrably wrong, the Chief 
Justice is asking judges to ignore their fundamental duty - to do jus-
tice in the individual case or controversy. 
"To be sure, the Chief Justice believes that he is doing justice, by 
constructing democracy-enhancing rules that might in the long run 
produce greater social justice (we are doubtful about this, for the rea-
sons suggested by Justice Posnerbrook). This represents an impover-
ished vision of our constitutional democracy, however. The Chief 
Justice's vision seems to make three ass~ptions about our republic: 
In statutory interpretation, courts are simply the agents of the legisla-
ture and play a subservient role (the agency assumption). As the legis-
lature's agents, courts ought to have as little policymaking discretion 
as possible (the interstitial policymaking assumption). As agents with 
at most interstitial policymaking power, courts ought to make rules by 
reference to their effects on the overall system, often sacrificing justice 
in the individual case (the ex ante assumption). These are profound 
and disturbing assumptions that underlie the Chief Justice's opinion. 
None of them is easily defensible within our constitutional traditions. 
"We start with the agency assumption - which we admit is widely 
believed but which we contend is not rigorously established. Virtually 
nothing in the Constitution supports this assumption, and a good deal 
undermines it. The Constitution's Preamble says that sovereignty in 
our polity rests with 'We the People.' Unlike England, we are a polity 
where state power is dispersed among three co-equal branches, not 
concentrated in one branch (the legislature). This is one reason we 
fought the Revolution and is a background assumption of the Consti-
tution's structure and anticipated operation. Under Article I, the leg-
islature enacts statutes. Under Article III, the judiciary - a co-equal 
branch - interprets and applies those statutes in actual 'Cases or Con-
troversies.' The constitutional language and structure do not suggest 
that courts are servile agents who owe their complete fealty to the 
legislature. Rather, it suggests that courts owe their complete fealty to 
'We the People.' This reveals the reason for Article III's focus on 
resolving the Case or Controversy, not on serving the legislature. 
Courts are not just agents of the legislature. Rather, the Constitution 
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suggests that both the legislature and the courts are agents of the pub-
lic good. Or, stated another way, the legislature and the courts are 
'partners' serving the ongoing enterprise of our public-seeking 
government. 
"Even if we accepted the agency assumption, we could not accept 
the interstitial policymaking assumption. The Chief Justice seems 
horrified by judicial discretion, and seems to assume that diligent and 
faithful agents do not make policy choices - at least not very often. 
This is very doubtful. If judges are like agents at all, they are like 
'relational agents,' namely, those agents given a long-range task and 
charged with using their 'best efforts' to accomplish that task over 
time. Relational agents are given detailed directives in many cases, 
but if new problems arise over time and the principal is not forthcom-
ing with new directives, the relational agent will take some degree of 
policy initiative, often bending the old directives beyond recognition. 
Most - but we admit, not all - principals would consider a relational 
agent to be a 'good' one if she exercised a great deal of discretion and 
used her best judgment in each case, rarely bothering the principal 
with questions about specific application of the directives. Conversely, 
most principals would be disappointed with a relational agent who 
literalistically followed the principal's directives in every situation, 
often with poor results; who came running back to the principal every 
time a directive seemed unclear in its application to specific circum-
stances; and - most of all - who held firmly to her original interpre-
tation of the principal's directives even though the interpretation 
produced bad results and who rationalized her rigidity by saying, 
'Well, the principal must know about this and she has never done any-
thing about it, so my hands are tied, because only the principal can 
change my earlier interpretation, which I admit was pretty stupid!' 
"Even if we accepted the first two assumptions underlying the 
Chief Justice's theory, we would find the third one unacceptable. In-
deed, the ex ante assumption for issues like this seems incoherent with 
the Chief Justice's first two assumptions. On the one hand, the Chief 
Justice tells us that we are crabbed little agents who ought to have 
little policymaking discretion. On the other hand, the Chief Justice 
asks us to make a judgment about issues of political interaction that 
are very complicated and laden with significant policy implications -
for the crowdedness and composition of the legislative agenda and for 
justice in individual Cases and Controversies, as well as for our own 
docket. How can the Chief Justice ask us to make such a policy-laden 
political judgment when he believes we are nothing but crabbed little 
agents? Isn't his position self-contradictory? 
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"It seems to us that if we accept the Chief Justice's reductionist 
vision of the role of this Court in statutory interpretation and if we 
accept the Chief Justice's ex ante arguments - none of which we can 
do - our proper course of action is to encourage the Chief Justice to 
use his position as head of the Judicial Conference to present his pro-
posal for absolute stare decisis to Congress. Even from our very differ-
ent assumptions, we should be most interested in Congress' response. 
We think that Congress would tell us that such a rule is a bad rule, 
because Congress has since the 1980s overruled a good many of our 
statutory precedents, because Congress does not want us to burden 
their agenda with yet more issues that the Court is better equipped to 
deal with anyway (e.g., tension between statutory precedents and sub-
sequent statutory policies; impact of evolving public values on earlier 
statutory precedents), and because Congress believes that federal 
judges should do justice in individual Cases and Controversies. We 
might be mistaken. Congress might decide to enact such a rule. But it 
is bootless for the Chief Justice to usurp a rule that his own assump-
tions leave to Congress, a rule that marginalizes what should be cen-
tral in our practice of judging - Do justice." 
* * * 
"Separate Opinion of MacFinley, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part and concurring in the result. The 
Chief Justice's opinion and the rule it announces are crazy. Its rheto-
ric purports to create a rational rule for treating statutory precedents, 
yet its purported rationality is dependent upon a range of irrational 
assumptions and upon a series of questionable logical leaps. Questions 
confront the Chief Justice's proposed rule and its underlying argumen-
tation at every tum. 
"Why should anyone care about changing the stare decisis rule for 
statutory precedents? It is a trivial issue. This Court overrules about 
one statutory precedent a Term. Why is this such a great calamity? 
Does it really contribute to majoritarianism and legislative supremacy 
for the Court to announce that it will no longer overrule statutory 
precedents? The Chief Justice thinks so, Justice Posnerbrook thinks 
not, and we find no basis for forming any opinion at all, since the 
debaters rely on academic public choice theory, which has been per-
suasively debunked from many different perspectives. Even if there 
were probable answers in this debate, how is this debate anything but 
an intellectual exercise? Even as an intellectual exercise, however, the 
Chief Justice's proposal goes nowhere. Consider the vulnerability of 
the Chief Justice's rule to standard highbrow-intellectual tests. 
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"Is the Chief Justice's proposal internally coherent? Surprisingly 
not. In a long line of precedents, this Court has held that statutory 
precedents can be overruled. The Chief Justice proposes that we 
should henceforth never overrule statutory precedents, but doesn't his 
proposal actually overrule a long line of 'statutory precedents'? The 
Chief Justice tries to wiggle out of this problem by arguing that the 
Court's rule of stare decisis in statutory cases is not itself a matter of 
statutory interpretation but is something more.26 Well, what is it? 
Although inspired by separation of powers concerns, the Chief Justice 
never makes the claim that this Court's longstanding practice of occa-
sionally overruling statutory precedents is unconstitutional.27 So it's 
hard to view the issue as one of constitutional interpretation. If our 
rule is neither statutory interpretation nor (as far as anyone can make 
out) constitutional interpretation, just about the only thing left is 'fed-
eral common law.' But, unhappily for the Chief Justice, his proposed 
rule of absolute stare decisis logically applies to common law prece-
dents just as much as it does to statutory precedents, and he admits 
that it would be incoherent to have a different rule for common law 
precedents.28 Therefore, under his own approach, the Chief Justice is 
wrong to overrule such a long line of precedents, however he chooses 
to characterize them. 
"Is it coherent to establish a tough bright-line rule for this Court's 
statutory and common law precedents so as to stimulate more con-
gressional activity, and not to do so for other precedents? We think 
not. For example, why shouldn't the Chief Justice favor a rule in 
which a consensus of the courts of appeals on a statutory issue essen-
tially binds this Court? Such a rule would have some complexities 
(e.g., defining a court of appeals consensus) but is not so different from 
Justice Stevens' 'Clearly articulated position in the 1980s.29 For that 
matter, why not a rule of absolute agency stare decisis, in which 
agency interpretations which pass initial judicial review cannot later 
be changed by the agency, or perhaps even by the courts? Surely Con-
gress, rather than an agency, is the more legitimate body to change 
26. ["[T]he question of an appropriate approach to statutory stare decisis is not simply a 
matter of statutory interpretation - it implicates the role of the federal courts in the constitu-
tional system. As such, it should not be subject to the rule proposed for matters of pure statutory 
interpretation." Marshall, supra note 7, at 220 n.199.] 
27. [See id. at 200-23 (basing absolute stare decisis rule on proper allocation of decisionmak-
ing between Court and Congress but nowhere arguing that the existing stare decisis rule is 
unconstitutional).] 
28. [See id. at 222-23.] 
29. [In the 1980s, Justice Stevens argued that the Court generally ought to defer to lower 
court consensus. E.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376-77 (1987) (Stevens, J., dis· 
senting); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).] 
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agency interpretations; and such a rule, like a rule binding the Court 
to a court of appeals consensus, would send a really strong message to 
Congress that it must monitor judicial and ~gency opinions and make 
whatever corrections are needed, rather than waiting for this Court or 
the agencies to make policy changes.30 The Chief J:ustice seems disin-
clined to expand upon his absolute stare decisis rule, albeit for prag-
matic rather than theoretical reasons. Yet all of the other members of 
this Court believe the proposal as a whole is impractical. If the Chief 
Justice is, for practical reasons, unwilling to urge absolute stare de<;isis 
for court of appeals consensus or for agency interpretations, then why 
shouldn't practical problems dissuade him from urging absolute stare 
decisis for statutory precedents? That is, indeed, the next question. 
"Will the Chief Justice's proposed rule really remove efforts to re-
consider statutory precedents from this Court's docket? Of course 
not. As we noted earlier, this Court rarely overrules a. statutory prece-
dent explicitly, for even under our traditional approach statutory 
precedents are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. A 
study done in the 1980s, for ~xample, found only twenty-six explicit 
overrulings between 1961 and 1987.31 But it is t~lling that the same 
study found twenty-four cases in which the Court implicitly overruled 
its statutory precedents. 32 The study also found · ~hirty-five cases in 
which the Court significantly revised statutory precedents by rejecting 
reasoning the Court characterized as 'dlcta.'33 An apparent implica-
tion of the study. is that the strong presumption against overruling 
statutory precedents still left the Court an enormous amount of discre-
tion to reinterpret precedents it didn't like, but without explicitly over-
ruling them. By distinguishing away undesirable precedents on thei! 
facts - a central judicial mode of reasoning - the Court can do es-
sentially the same thing under the Chief Justice's, absolute rule that it 
has long been doing under the previous stare decisis rule. 34 
30. And why shouldn't the Chief Justice favor absolute stare decisis in constitutional. cases? 
The Court's expansive willingness in the twentieth century to overrule its constitutional prece-
dents at almost•every tum might help explain (to the Chief Justice, at least) why there have been 
no substantive constitutional amendments after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933. Under the 
Chief Justice's analysis, the Court's flexible approach (vastly more flexible- than its approach to 
statutory precedents) essentially removed important constitutional i~sues from the constitution-
ally assigned procedure for change - through constitutional amendment (Article V). To en-
courage the operation of the majoritarian mechanism for changing ,the Constitution, one might 
expect the Chief Justice to urge absolute or strict stare decisis for constitutional precedents as 
well. 
31. [See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1427-29.] 
32. [See id. at 1430-34 (listing cases and providing evidence from within the Court's opin-
ions, as well as concurring and dissenting opinions).] 
33. [See id. at 1435-39.] · 
34. The Chief Justice has a much rosier view than we do. He seems to think that Justices 
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"Is it democracy-enhancing to throw the big policy issues back to 
Congress? The Chief Justice's main normative pitch is that democ-
racy requires Congress to make all the big decisions, but such a pitch 
rests upon a strained (albeit widely believed) vision of democracy. The 
Chief Justice flogs the idea that there is a democracy continuum, with 
Congress at the top and this Court at the bottom. That hierarchy is 
most believable if you are a well-to-do white male, for it is they who 
have traditionally controlled the legislative process, which effectively 
marginalizes the poor, women, persons of color, gay men and lesbians, 
socialists, and people who don't speak English well. When you add up 
the numbers, the marginalized groups are seventy to eighty percent of 
the population. Consider the Mann Act (how aptly named). It was 
enacted by a Congress when women could not vote as a matter of law, 
and blacks and the poor could not vote as a matter of practice. Our 
exclusion shows up in the law, which mir!ors the prejudices and ste-
reotypes shared by white well-to-do men in the early part of the cen-
tury. If one wants to appeal to majoritarianism, the Mann Act is 
unconstitutional, for it has never represented the interests of most of 
America. The Chief Justice probably believes things are significantly 
'better' now, for women and blacks are at least able to vote (and the 
Mann Act in 1986 was amended to be at least apparently gender-neu-
tral). We challenge that view. Congress is still lily white (for example, 
no African-Americans sit in the Senate, a few dozen sit in the House), 
male (two women are in the Senate, several dozen in the House), and 
wealthy (the Senate is a white male millionaires' club, and the House 
only somewhat less so). While marginalized groups at least have or-
ganized lobbies nowadays, the overwhelming majority of the lobbies 
would be "red-faced" to distinguish away precedents, but his only example cuts against him. In 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), this Court declined to overrule Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected 
black parents whose children had been excluded from private schools on grounds of race. Patter· 
son was a lawsuit under the same statute by a black woman who claimed she was discharged 
from her job on grounds of race. The Chief Justice says: "It is hard to imagine, for example that 
any member of the Court in Patterson, much less a majority of the Court, could have pretended 
to distinguish away Runyon .••. " [See Marshall, supra note 7, at 218 (same quote).] The Chief 
Justice is quite wrong. While both Patterson and Runyon involved racial discrimination in con· 
tract matters, the former involved job discrimination, while the latter involved education dis· 
crimination. Job discrimination claims against private employers were after 1964 
comprehensively regulated by Title VII, whose elaborate procedures could be circumvented eas-
ily - probably contrary to the intent of the 1964 Congress - by filing under the 1866 statute 
instead (as Patterson herself did). Not only would this allow the Court in Patterson to distin· 
guish Runyon, but this is in fact the approach five Members of this Court actually did take to 
support their willingness to narrow Runyon. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374-75. So far as we know, 
those five Justices were not "red-faced," even though the four dissenting Justices accused them of 
subverting stare decisis. See 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); 109 S. Ct. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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are still white and male and well-to-do. Given these political realities, 
is it any surprise that Congress has never repealed the Mann Act, and 
that its trivial amendments to the statute in 1986 failed to grapple with 
the Caminetti issue?35 When the decision came down in 1917, Con-
gress probably thought it was great, and after the statute became little-
enforced {and usually against the poor and politically marginal) no 
one in the wealthy white male club cared. How is any of this 
majoritarian? The Chief Justice has been brainwashed by law. He 
should wake up and see the reality, that Congress 'represents' the 
views of white male elites and not the views of the majority of the 
population, and that for many of us the Court is the only potential 
'representative' we have. 
"Will the Chief Justice's proposal have countermajoritarian conse-
quences? We believe so. It will exacerbate the antimajoritarian fea-
tures we have identified in the Congress. 36 There are usually winner 
groups and loser groups in the big statutory interpretation cases. If 
the losers are well-organized elite groups (even better, a coalition of 
them), they can get the issue on the legislative agenda, usually pretty 
quickly, and have at least a shot at overruling the precedent. If the 
losers are not well-organized groups, and especially if they are blue 
collar or poor, it is much harder for them to get the issue on the legis-
lative agenda, and substantially harder to get the precedent overruled 
by Congress. Under the Chief Justice's proposal, the 'haves' come out 
way ahead. Their wins - unless they are wins against other 'have' 
groups - are assured, and their losses can be dealt with through legis-
lative overruling at least in some cases. 'Have-not' groups, on the 
35. The House committee report accompanying the 1986 amendment, for example, reveals 
no clear understanding of the Caminetti issue. The committee did complain that the original 
language (transportation "for any other immoral purpose") was too broad, but substituted lan-
guage ("sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense") which is 
almost as broad and which incorporates the sexist puritanical standards of state and even local 
laws regulating sexual conduct. See H.R. REP. No. 99-910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986), re-
printed in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5952, 5958. (There was no Senate committee 
report for this bill.) Indeed, by linking the federal crime to "sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense," including state criminal statutes, the 1986 revision may 
be a step backwards from Caminetti (though we don't necessarily think that was Congress' ex-
pectation). For example, Virginia law criminalizes oral sex between husband and wife, VA. 
CoDE ANN. § 18.2-361 (criminalizing "crimes against nature," including oral sex between a man 
and a woman), which is not necessarily an "immoral purpose" under Caminettl 
36. [See also Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 104-07 (1988). 
Marshall, supra note 7, at 227, finds that this sort of argument "is based on the very objectionable 
premise that it is legitimate for courts to shape doctrines of statutory interpretation in ways that 
either mitigate the effects of Congress' actual decisions, or try to keep issues out of the congres-
sional arena altogether." I disagree here, as well as elsewhere, with Marshall's characterization 
of this argument, which in no way seeks to remove issues from the legislative agenda and is just 
realistic about what is likely to get on that agenda. Indeed, this argument merely reflects Mar-
shall's own belief that the Court might consider the overall functioning of our democracy in 
crafting its rules of interpretation.] 
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other hand, lose what is often their only effective forum for overruling 
a bad precedent, namely, the courts. We do not believe these are iron-
clad rules of politics, but they frequently explain things rather well. 
We think there is a real danger that the Chief Justice's proposed rule 
will exacerbate the already-existing unfairness of the legislative process 
for marginalized Americans. 
"Enough has been said about an issue that is doomed to the ash-
cans of academe. If we want to do anything in this area, we should be 
making it easier, rather than harder, to overrule statutory precedents." 
* * * 
After his colleagues circulated their concurring opinions, Chief 
Justice Marshall circulated a "Memorandum to the Conference," 
which suggested a new opinion for the Court. The Chief Justice's re-
vised opinion held that Amorous' conviction should be vacated under 
a dynamic reading of Caminetti and Squalid. 37 The Chief Justice rea-
soned that only the "legal standard" of Caminetti and Squalid is bind-
ing on the Court, not their application to any specific set of facts. The 
legal standard of the precedents is that Amorous is to be convicted 
only if his conduct is 'immoral in light of current social mores.' Since 
our mores in 2001 are vastly different from those in 1993 (Squalid) or 
1917 (Caminetti), the ChiefJustice found himself free to reach a differ-
ent result in Amorous and yet proclaim himself loyal to stare decisis. 
Although the Chief Justice's opinion ultimately attracted only 
enough votes (Justices MacFinley and Kennedy) to be a plurality 
opinion in the case, its publication last month has created a sensation 
and has thrust the Chief Justice into the forefront of the "dynamic 
statutory interpretation" movement. I applaud the dynamism of the 
Chief Justice's final opinion. It reminds us that even adherents of judi-
cial restraint (judges as agents) ought to interpret statutes dynamically 
when the statutes use broad terms drawn from or similar to common 
law ideas. 38 
37. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 2470. 
38. Thus Chief Justice Marshall's willingness to interpret general terms (such as "immoral 
purpose") very dynamically might justify dynamic interpretation of many of the most frequently 
litigated federal statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Sherman Act's prohibitions of contracts "in 
restraint of trade" and attempts "to monopolize"); 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a (Robinson-Patman Act's 
prohibition against price "discrimination" for the purpose of "destroying competition"); 15 
U.S.C. § 77(b)(l) (Securities Act definition of "security" by reference to several common law 
commercial forms); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Securities & Exchange Act§ IO(b) prohibition of "manipu-
lative and deceptive device"); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (criminalizing "false, fictitious or fraudulent 
statements"); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (criminalizing "any scheme or artifice to defraud" using 
mail or wire communications); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act criminalizing "robbery" and "ex-
tortion"); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (RICO provisions defining "racketeering activity" and "enterprise" 
by reference to common law terms.); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (various "anti-discrimination" stat-
utes); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII prohibiting "discrimination" in employment practices). 
